Toyota: The New Number One?
* Production tools
When asked what he thinks the Pontiac Solstice will do for Pontiac, John Larson, Pontiac division general manager, answers without reservation, "Worlds." Before the first car rolled out of the Wilmington, DE, assembly plant, the division had 9,000 orders. While Larson admits that some of those people might not follow through, the level of enthusiasm that he’s witnessed for the vehicle (during the press introduction in Portland, Oregon, one of the "first 1,000" people to place an order for the car spotted a photo on a blog, analyzed the background, determined where the hotel was, and set out to see the cars and to meet people who have been raised to demigod status in that world, like Small Car vehicle line executive Lori Queen), he’s not concerned that they’ll be able to sell what they build. And while he’s not specific about the number of vehicles that they’ll be building annually in the plant–low-volume production that will be shared with Saturn when it comes out with its Sky roadster in the first quarter of ‘06–he provides a ballpark of 15,000 to 20,000 units, but notes that they’ll always try to have one less Solstice than there is demand for, a strategy that was used by Mazda for its Miata two-seater … speaking of which, Larson points out that the 9,000 orders is nearly the number of Miatas sold last year (9,356). While there was some pre-production public speculation that the program was being delayed, Larson points out that they’d always promised that the vehicle would be coming in the Summer of ‘05, and that the first 1,000* went out the first week of August. "We’re on the cusp of great things at Pontiac."
* Integration vehicles
About those widely reported hiccoughs for the Solstice, the problems with the front fascia, the top, etc. Lori Queen explains that if the Solstice had been a high-volume, high-risk vehicle (like, say, the Chevrolet Cobalt, a program that she was working on at the same time as the Solstice), then those problems would have been, well, problematic. But in the case of the Solstice, this was a matter of expectation, not enormous concern. That is, the development of the program was one where they went from the math data to production tools. There were no intermediate prototype tools–or vehicles built (so-called "integration vehicles")–as would be the norm in a vehicle program. Part of this was an issue of cost, as this was to be not only a low-volume program, but a low-cost program, as well, with the car starting at less than $20,000 ("Ten years ago, a vehicle with fewer than 30,000 units would be a premium program," Queen remarks). And it was a matter of timing, too (it was a 27-month program), and tooling builds take plenty of time. "We pulled tools ahead and assumed that there would be fit or processing problems," Queen says, which is certainly a non-traditional approach to vehicle development. In fact, the entire program–which she not entirely facetiously describes as "no volume, no money, no time"–was one where non-traditional approaches were the norm, not the exception. Normally, she explains, there would be three iterations:
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GM’s home market though may be what causes the capitulation. With planned layoffs and plant closings in progress, GM is dumping excess capacity in favor of anticipated need. Toyota, on the other hand, cannot keep up with capacity as demand for its three lines of vehicles –- Toyota, Lexus, and Scion –- continue to drive growth. Indeed, if there is factory space available, Toyota will use it to produce more vehicles. So, the prediction for Toyota overtaking GM is based largely on available capacity and demand.
* Pre-prototypes